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DAVID S. ABBEY and CHARLES D. KOLSTAD*

The Structure of International
Steam Coal Markets
A common view is that the international coal market is reasonably
competitive and that prices will tend towards long-run marginal costs.
However, analyses of many commodities reveal the importance of market
imperfections and market power in explaining price formation and trade
flows. A review of the structure of the steam coal market suggests the
market is not perfectly competitive. Considering industrial concentration,
market shares and government policy, it is possible to identify participants
with the potential to exercise market power. These include the Republic
of South Africa, Australia, and Poland on the supply side and Japan and
the European Community on the demand side.
I. INTRODUCTION
Rising prices for oil and gas over the past decade have led to increased
worldwide demand for steam coal, which in turn has increased international steam coal trade. Two basic applied economics problems arise in
examining commodity trade, including coal. First, what are the determinants of trade flows and market shares for various producing and
consuming countries? A second problem, which in some sense is an
extension of the first, concerns forecasting future trade and the effects of
government policies on trade. The United States, for example, is anxious
to do as much as possible to enhance its coal export prospects. Addressing
these problems requires an understanding of how coal markets are structured, what market power can be wielded by participants, and what factors
enter into production and consumption decisions.
The conventional wisdom is that the international coal market is competitive by virtue of abundant endowment and wide distribution of coal
resources, and large numbers of consuming and importing nations. For
example, the annual report of IEA Coal Research (a unit of Great Britain's
National Coal Board) suggests that:
There is sufficient free competition in and between the four major
exporting countries [Australia, Canada, South Africa and the United
States] for the price of coal to tend towards long run marginal cost.'
*Economics Group, Los Alamos National Laboratory and Department of Economics, University
of Illinois. Work sponsored by U.S. Department of Energy and conducted while both authors were
with the Economics Group of the Los Alamos National Laboratory in New Mexico.
1. lEA COAL RESEARCH, 1981 ANNUAL REPORT 8 (1981).
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However, market analyses of many other comodities traded internationally-notably crude oil and grain-reveal the inadequacy of the perfect
competition market model in explaining trade patterns. 2
Perfect competition requires complete information, free entry and exit
of firms, and sufficient numbers of buyers and sellers so that individual
actions don't affect prices. However, as a consequence of concentration
of buyers and sellers or government intervention, the exercise of power
to influence commodity trade flows and prices is not uncommon. The
objective of this paper is to analyze the international steam coal market
in order to infer market conduct which in turn determines price levels
and trade patterns.
The analysis progresses in three stages. First, we review basic conditions and structure of the steam coal market to determine which actorsnational governments, state traders, or private firms-are capable of wielding
market power. We address five aspects of the market: (a) geographical
structure of supply, demand and transportation (including quality of coal
resources, resources by mining type, and access to deepwater ports); (b)
concentration among producers and consumers; (c) barriers to entry; (d)
the structure of demand; and (e) government trade policies (including
formal economic blocs, preferred trading relations, and export and import
quotas).
We conclude that potential power in steam coal trade rests with a
number of different actors: the European Economic Community and Japan, by virtue of dominance in import demand; the Republic of South
Africa, due to low FOB-port coal costs, a domestic producer cartel, and
a system of export licenses and quotas; Australia, owing to low FOB port
coal costs, export controls, and a relatively concentrated steam coal export
industry; and Poland, through the force of a state monopoly and close
proximity to European markets. One might also include multi-national
corporations (MNCs), considering their superior technical capabilities and
access to information concerning energy markets. Admittedly, this is no
exclusive club. One might argue it is so large as to render any concept
of power to set prices meaningless. However, we offer some historic
examples of the exercise of market power in coal trade that suggest
otherwise.
The second stage of the analysis is a qualitative description of the
conduct of the actors in the steam coal market. First, we hypothesize the
objectives of the various actors (e.g., to maximize short-run profits or
export earnings). Then we consider strategies the actors might pursue in
2. See McCalla, Structural and Market Power Considerationsin Imperfect Agricultural Markets,
in IMPERFECT MARKETS IN AGRICULTURAL TRADE 9 (198 1); and Radetzki, Market Structure
and BargainingPower: A Study of Three InternationalMineral Markets, 6 RESOURCES POLICY
115 (1978).
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a multilateral framework-that is, when each actor with market power
is trying to anticipate actions and reactions of competitors. This qualitative
approach provides some insight into alternative models of price formation;
however, it is inconclusive by definition.
Finally, we provide a brief review of conventional market models of
imperfect competition-for example, various models of oligopoly and
oligopsony, producer cartels, and so forth-in an effort to match one such
model with the observed market structure. Through this three step process
we develop a framework for quantitative analysis of the international
steam coal market.
II. BASIC MARKET CONDITIONS AND STRUCTURE
By way of introduction we present some background information on
international coal use. Table I reports coal production and consumption
by country in 1980. Not surprisingly, consumption is concentrated heavily
in the industrial nations. The United States, the Soviet Union, and China
account for 55 percent of world consumption. These nations, with Poland
and the United Kingdom, account for nearly two-thirds of world consumption. Most of the major consuming nations produce their domestic
requirements with the notable exceptions of France, East Germany, and
Japan. Considering the bulk of coal, the relatively high proportion of
transportation costs in delivered costs, and the widespread global distribution of coal resources, the reliance on domestic supply is not surprising.
In 1980 trade of metallurgical and steam coal accounted for only 331
million standard tons3 (about 11 percent of consumption). Historically,
much of world coal trade has been overland trade to neighboring countries-for example, from the western Soviet Union to eastern Europe,
Poland to western Europe, and the United States to Canada (see Fig. 1).
While little international data is available that distinguishes trade flows
by coal types, metallurgical coal, not steam coal, has clearly dominated
trade.
One can make three broad judgments on the outlook for the international
coal market.4 First, considering forecasts of steel output and technological
change, trade of metallurgical coal is likely to stagnate or decline. Second,
since delivered prices of steam coal to Europe and Japan are about half
the energy equivalent price of crude oil or natural gas, rapid growth in
steam coal demand is possible. Such growth depends on the future of oil
prices and nuclear power--coal's major competition for electricity generation. Third, coal production in many industrialized nations will stag3. As used in this report, a standard ton of coal is 25,190,000 Btu.
4. See generally M. GASKIN, MARKET ASPECTS OF AN EXPANSION OF THE INTERNATIONAL STEAM COAL MARKET (lEA Coal Research, 1981).
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TABLE I.
1980 Coal Production, Consumption and Exports
for Major Producing and
a
Consuming Nations
Production
(106 short tons)
United States
Canada
Other America
West Germany
France
United Kingdom
Other Western Europe
USSR
Poland
Czechoslovakia
East Germany
Bulgaria
Hungary
Romania
South Africa
Australia
China
India
Japan
North Korea
Other

830
40
24
239
23
141
140
790
254
136
285
32
28
39
127
140
684
125
20
50
51
4,198

Apparent Consumption
(106 stc)
614
34
30
140
57
126
150
504
190
73
96
25
16
27
84
78
582
88
98
50
54
3,116

Exports
(106 stc)
97
18
22
1
7
5
38
40
7
2
30
5i
5
3
10
331

'Countries with less than 25 units of consumption or production are listed in Other. Units are either
short tons or standard tons of coal (I stc = 25,190,000 Btu).
Source: U.S. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY, 1981 INTERNATIONAL ENERGY ANNUAL 181
(EIA-0219, 1982).

nate or decline, principally because depletion leads to higher mining costs.
The Netherlands abandoned production in the early 1970s. France, the
United Kingdom, and West Germany heavily subsidize their domestic
industries through direct payment, import quotas, or purchasing requirements placed on utilities. In short, rapid growth in steam coal trade seems
likely. To determine which countries will benefit from trade, we next
consider the spatial distribution of supply and demand.
A. GeographicalStructure of Supply and Demand
The logical criteria for screening the most favored export countries are
quantity and quality of resources and transportation costs to the dominant

October 1983]

INTERNATIONAL STEAM COAL MARKETS

00

<2
.z,

'U

z
0

,
.

0

n
o
LL

•

NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL

[Vol. 23

TABLE II.
Estimated World Coal Reserves
(106 stc)
Recoverable
Reserves'

Percent
World
Total

USSR
United States
People's Republic of China
Australia
Federal Republic of Germany
United Kingdom
Poland
Canada
India
South Africa
Other

109,900
177,588
98,883
27,353
34,419
45,000
21,790
9,381
33,700
26,903
52,012

17.3
27.9
15.5
4.3
5.4
7.1
3.4
1.5
5.3
4.2
8.1

4,860,000
2,570,398
1,438,045
262,134
246,800
163,576
124,000
115,352
56,799
57,566
231,834

48.0
25.4
14.2
2.6
2.4
1.6
1.2
1.1
0.6
0.6
2.3

World Total

636,929

100.00

10,126,504

100.0

Total
Resources'

Percent
World
Total

'Amount of reserves in place that can be recovered under present local economic conditions using
available technology.
bTotal amount available in the earth that can be successfully exploited and used by man within the
foreseeable future.
Source: World Energy Conference Survey of Energy Resources, 1977, cited in NATIONAL COAL
ASSOCIATION, INTERNATIONAL COAL: 1978 I-1 (1979).

import markets in the industrialized nations of Europe and East Asia.
Table II shows estimated recoverable reserves and resources by country.
The Soviet Union, China, and the United States possess 60 percent of
recoverable reserves and 85 percent of resources. However, these endowments are less important than mine production and especially transportation costs, because coal resources are so abundant. For example,
Botswana's reserves of hard coal-3.5 billion standard tons of coal which
appear in the "Other" category of Table II-are sufficient for more than
a year of world consumption.
1. Resource Quality. With respect to coal quality, sulfur content less
than 1.5 percent is a standard specification of internationally traded coal,
calculated to meet environmental standards and obviate the installation
of flue gas desulfurization equipment. Specification of heating value is
typically over 10,000 Btu/lb and preferably in the range of 11,00013,000 Btu/lb (in other words, bituminous coal). Lower quality coal
serves domestic markets.
What accounts for the disinterest in sub-bituminous coal in the international market? Consider first the situation of a country with a large

October 1983]

INTERNATIONAL

STEAM COAL MARKETS

domestic coal market relative to export demand (such as the United
States). Assume a simple competitive model with one source of supply
of bituminous and sub-bituminous coal and one point of consumption.
Assume further that domestic delivered energy cost (for example, $/106
Btu) is the sole determinant of the price differential between bituminous
and sub-bituminous coal. The costs of acquiring each coal type (measured
in thermal units) tend to equalize:
(P, + t/a, = (Pb + t)/ab,
(1)
where a i is the heat content of coal i, t is the unit cost of transportation,
and Pb and P, are the mine-mouth prices of bituminous and sub-bituminous
coal.
Suppose a new source of demand develops in a more distant (export)
market served at unit transport cost, T (T > t). If export demand is small
in relation to domestic demand, or more precisely, if the export demand
has no effect on domestic prices, then, as shown by Equation 2, subbituminous or lower quality coal will not be used in the export market,
since in equilibrium it will appear to be more costly than bituminous coal:
(Ps + T)/ot >

(Pb + T)/ab

.

(2)

This suggests that if a large domestic market exists, prices of sub-bituminous coal will be set by domestic demand in such a way that the coal
cannot compete with bituminous coal in distant markets.
Now consider the case where export demand determines mine-mouth
prices. Transportation costs require a minimum price differential between
bituminous and sub-bituminous coals. Equation 3 shows the value PS/Pb
for which Equation 2 is an equality:

P5 _ a

T

Pb

Pb

ab

)

(3)

ab

In interpreting this equation, consider first the case of mine-mouth consumption (T = 0). In such a case the ratio of mine-mouth coal prices is
precisely the ratio of heating values for the two coals. However, the larger
the ratio T/Pb, the larger the price penalty of low-grade coal. For Australia
and the Republic of South Africa to Japan, the ratio T/Pb is about 0.5.
Assuming heating values of 9,000 Btu/l b for sub-bituminous and 12,000
for Btu/lb for bituminous coal, the sub-bituminous coal supplier would
receive at best a mine-mouth price about 60 percent that of the bituminous
producer.
This analysis can extend to a comparison of countries competing to
supply coal. For a developing country, such as Chile, that is a potential
supplier of low-quality coal, the ratio T/Pb is likely to be greater, making
the price outlook even more bleak. Finally, when one considers that boiler
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TABLE III.
Selected January 1982 Spot International Steam Coal and Shipping Prices
(averaged, U.S. 1981 dollars/ton)

U.S. east coast to NW Europe
Poland to Italy
South Africa to Europe
Australia to Europe
U.S. east coast to Japan
South Africa to Japan
Australia to Japan

Price
FOB Port

Ocean
Freighta

Delivered
Price

$59.50
64.50
55.00
60.50
59.50
55.00
60.50

9
8
11
15
21
10
9

68.50
72.50
66.00
75.50
80.50
65.00
69.50

'This freight cost does not include demurrage charges (for ships waiting to load), which can be
significant.
Source: Coal Week International,January 20 and February 10, 1982.

equipment, flue gas cleaning, and solid waste disposal costs also increase
with lower quality coals, one understands the near-exclusive interest in
bituminous coal in the international market.
Several factors determine the competitive position of bituminous coal
suppliers: the method of extraction (surface or underground); proximity
of coal fields to demand centers and ports; and the extent of existing
transportation infrastructure (rail line capacity, port loading capacity, and
port depth). The infrastructure criterion places new entrants to the international market, especially developing countries, at substantial disadvantage. In the remainder of this section, we provide brief characterizations
of the leading exporters.'

2. Spatial Distribution. Tables III and IV present estimates of steam
coal costs and delivered prices to Europe and Japan from the major
exporting nations. It is important to realize that Table III reflects prices
whereas Table IV is an estimate of costs. Single time-point delivered
prices are not necessarily indicative of competitive advantage because of
price volatility (for example, in ocean charter rates), and especially because FOB port prices are not necessarily representative of marginal costs.
Nevertheless, it is apparent from Table IV that Poland and the Republic
of South Africa have a great advantage in the European markets, and
5. For more thorough country reviews, see R. GREENE & J. GALLAGHER, FUTURE COAL
PROSPECTS: COUNTRY AND REGIONAL ASSESSMENTS (1980); ICF, INC., COAL RESERVES AND PRODUCTION IN EIGHT MAJOR, NON-U.S. COAL PRODUCING COUNTRIES
(1978); and ICF, INC., COAL SUPPLY CURVES FOR AUSTRALIA, CANADA, AND SOUTH
AFRICA (1980).
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TABLE IV.
Indicative Steam Coal Costs'
(1979 U.S. $/ton)
Price Mine
FOB
to
Mine Port

Delivered
Price
Price
Port Ocean
Port
FOB
Port Loading Freight Unloading Range Avg. $/MBtu

TO: NW Europe
FROM:
United States
East-Underground 22-39 11-17 33-50
9-20 11-22 22-39
West-Surface

1-2
1-2

7-11
9-12

2
2

43-65
34-55

54
45

1.85
2.19

Canada
West-Surface

17-22 11-20 28-39

1

9-12

2

40-55

46

1.92

Australia
Underground
Surface

17-28
13-22

6-11 22-28
6-11 20-28

2
2

11-15
11-15

2
2

37-47
35-47

43
42

1.63
1.52

South Africa
Underground

11-17

6- 8 17-24

1

9-11

2

29-39

34

1.41

25-34

1

6

2

34-43

39

1.46

TO: Japan
FROM:
United States
East-Underground 22-39 11-17 33-50
9-20 11-22 22-39
West-Surface

1-2
1-2

12-17
10-13

2
1

48-70
34-55

59
44

2.05
2.00

Poland
Underground

Canada
West-Surface

17-22 11-22 28-39

1

8

1

39-50

44

2.00

Australia
Underground
Surface

17-28
13-22

6-11 22-28
6-11 20-28

2
2

7- 9
7- 9

1
1

32-40
30-40

36
35

1.38
1.33

South Africa
Underground

11-17

6- 8 17-24

1

10

1

29-36

33

1.36

25-34

1

12-14

1

40-48

44

1.67

Poland
Underground

'Costs may not correspond to prices.
Source: U.S. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY, COAL EXPORT STUDY 9 (1979) cited in C. WILSON,
COAL: BRIDGE TO THE FUTURE 126 (Ballinger, 1980).
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Australia and the Republic of South Africa have the lead in the Pacific
Rim markets. Poland, of course, can deliver cheaply by rail to eastern
European countries, and from Gdansk (with a 100,000-dwt vessel capacity)6 and other ports to western Europe.
The coal fields of Transvaal in the Republic of South Africa are several
hundred miles by rail from the principal port at Richards Bay, which
presently accommodates 160,000 dwt super-colliers. Dredging plans exist
to accommodate 250,000 dwt colliers. More importantly, mine production
costs are exceptionally low. A U.S. coal industry analyst estimates South
African mine-mouth costs at $14.80/ton and rail and loading costs at
about $10/ton. 7 Considering the representative FOB port price of $50/
ton shown in Table III, these costs imply an incredible profit at the mine
of $26/ton.
Australia has vast bituminous coal fields within 100 miles of existing
ports in Queensland and New South Wales. Almost all Queensland production is by surface mining methods. New South Wales production is
about 75 percent underground. Hay Point, the largest port, can accommodate 135,000 dwt colliers. Other ports--Gladstone, Newcastle, Port
Kembla, and Sydney-which are presently in the 60,000 dwt class, are
being deepened to accommodate vessels in excess of 100,000 dwt. 8
Those Canadian coal fields with potential in the export market occur
in the Rocky Mountains region of Alberta and British Columbia. Rugged
terrain and faulted, steeply dipping seams make extraction of some resources quite difficult and expensive. Elsewhere, however, potential exists
for surface mining, with some seams up to twenty feet thick.9 Transportation distances are about 700 miles to existing ports (with capacity greater
than 150,000 dwt) in the Vancouver area.
Western U.S. coal reserves are mostly sub-bituminous. The bituminous
reserves in Utah, Colorado, New Mexico, and Wyoming are roughly
1,000 miles from the Pacific coast ports, which presently lack the capacity
to handle large volumes of coal. On the east coast, the Appalachian coal
fields are within several hundred miles of ports at Norfolk and Baltimore.
In 1981, the U.S. coal industry had well over 100 million tons per year
(MT/yr) excess capacity.' ° Existing U.S. rail capacity is adequate to
handle increased coal traffic, and, after a few difficult years, the ports
seem to have adapted shipping terminals to the handling of steam coal.
6. Dwt = Dead weight tons, a measure of vessel capacity. Larger capacity vessels usually have
a larger draft requiring deeper ports.
7. Price, The Coal Observer Treks to South Africa, COAL OBSERVER 12 (Feb. 1981).
8. AUSTRALIA DEP'T. OF TRADE AND RESOURCES, AUSTRALIA'S MINERAL RESOURCES: STEAMING COAL 8,9 (1980).
9. ICF, INC. (1980), supra note 5, at 3-13.
10. U.S. DEP'T. OF ENERGY, COAL PRODUCTION-1981 74 (1982).
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A major problem in the eastern United States, aside from relatively high
production costs, is that harbors are limited to colliers in the Panamax
class (less than 60,000-70,000 dwt). Port dredging from current depths
of 40 feet to 60 feet or more is quite expensive and faces budget authorization battles and lengthy permit reviews.
The Soviet Union probably will not be an important factor in the world
market for steam coal. " Only six percent of Soviet reserves are in eastern
Europe where coal fields are heavily depleted. 2 In the Donets Basin, for
example, which contributes about 30 percent of Soviet output, the average
working depth is below 500 metres and 80 percent of the seams are less
than one metre thick. More remote Soviet fields in the Arctic and Asia
suffer from severe climatic conditions, making extraction and transportation difficult and expensive. The Sourth Yakutia basin in the far East
currently supplies coking coal and a small amount of steam coal to Japan
(the contract calls for 85 million tons over about 20 years), but Pacific
ports are about 1,500 miles away by rail. (Slurry pipelines may provide
a promising transportation alternative.)
A few developing countries have potential to enter the export market
before the year 2000--Colombia, China, Indonesia, and perhaps India.
However, for these countries more than for existing producers, port proximity is vital. Coal export development typically involves not only new
mine construction as in industrialized countries, but new port and rail
construction. Furthermore, one may expect limited opportunities for economies in freight cost through the handling of other commodities. Botswana is occasionally mentioned as a potential exporter. Certainly Botswana
has substantial strippable coal resources, but getting coal to Walvis Bay
in Namibia requires 1,000 miles of railroad construction across the Kalahari Desert. 3
B. Concentration
The question of concentration concerns the number of producing and
consuming firms in importing and exporting countries, the role and number of trading companies, and the market shares of trading countries.
1. Number of Firms by Country. There are many steam coal producers
worldwide, although there is considerable range in producer competition
within individual exporting countries. For example, coal ownership, proJuction, and trading is by state monopoly in Poland. In developing coun11. See generally U.S. OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, TECHNOLOGY AND
SOVIET ENERGY AVAILABILITY (1981); and U.S. CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY,
.JSSR: COAL INDUSTRY PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS (1980).
12. U.S. OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, supra note 11, at 84-86.
13. Swersey, Emergent Coal Suppliers to the Atlantic Basin, available from the author at Exxon
vlinerals Co., New York (1981).
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TABLE V.

South African Export Allocations by Exporter (1981)
Annual Maximum Export Allocation
Exporter

(10 tonslyr)

(cumulative fraction)

TCOA'
GENCOR
Amcoal
Shell
BP
Rand Mines
Antracite Producers Association
Total (Rance)

12
7.5
6
5.5
5.5
2.5
2.5
2.5

0.27
0.44
0.58
0.70
0.83
0.89
0.94
1.00

44.0
'Includes 2 Mt/yr allocation to Natal Assoc. Collieries, which is managed by the TCOA.
bSelling organization for Amcoal, Graham Beck, and Duiker Exploration.
Source: Ellis, COAL, GOLD, AND BASE MINERALS OF SOUTHERN AFRICA 93 98 (June,
1981).

tries, coal ownership is typically by state monopoly, though production
and trading rights may be leased or assigned to joint-venture partners. In
the United States, there are hundreds of producers. Because of the more
limited number of producers in Australia and the Republic of South Africa,
as well as their cost advantages noted above, these countries warrant
special attention.
The South African coal mining scene is complicated by the presence
of domestic price controls and export licenses. Nonetheless, a high degree
of industrial concentration is evident. Collieries operated by six mining
houses-Anglo-American Corporation (Amcoal), General Mining Union
Corporation (GENCOR), Barlow Rand (Rand Mines), Johannesburg Consolidated Investment Co., Lonhro South Africa, and Gold Fields of South
Africa-accounted for 92 percent of 1979 coal production. 4 All six are
members of the Transvaal Coal Owners Association (TCOA), whose
function is to assign production quotas and market and distribute membei
output. 15The TCOA is also the principal owner of the export terminal al
Richards Bay. Table V shows export allocations under phase III of the
export development program (to be achieved by the mid-1980s). Allocations to the TCOA and individual TCOA members, totaling 28 Mt/yr,
represent 63 percent of current export allocations. Three multinational
14. Cooperation Leads to Efficient Marketing, 1/2 MINING SURVEY 43 (1981).
15. See Ellis, Coal Export-Staking Out the Issues, 29 COAL, GOLD, AND BASE MINERAL!
OF SOUTH AFRICA 93 (1981); and MINING SURVEY, supra note 14, at 53.
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energy companies-Shell, BP, and Total-have most of the remaining
export allocations. They
obtain coal from joint-venture projects with
6
South African firms.'
Australia has a history of concentration in the coal industry.' 7 With
rapid growth in the Austrialian export market and the possibility of minority foreign investment, one might expect increased competition. A
government compiled inventory lists 40 corporate ventures into the steam
coal export market.I" Yet, examination of this inventory reveals considerable corporate interlocking in joint ventures and suggests a pattern of
concentration in Australian development that may be representative of
concentration in the world market. 9
Consider the kinds of firms involved in Australian coal export projects.20
Domestic ownership is strongly represented by large mining houses (for
example, BHP, Peko-Wallsend, and MIM), and other conglomerates (CSR
and White Industries). Multinational corporations engaged in resource
extraction have purchased major stakes in Australian coal firms or have
active Australian subsidiaries. For example, Rio Tinto Zinc of England
controls CRA, Ltd.; British Petroleum purchased Clutha in 1978; Shell
owns 37 percent of Austen and Butta and 45 percent of Bellambi Coal
Company; and Arco owns 32.5 percent of R. W. Miller and 38 percent
of Blair Athol. Finally, many of the projects involve investment by coal
importers, notably the general trading companies of Japan-Mitsui, Marubeni, Mitsubishi, and C. Itoh; foreign coal consumers (for example,
the Electric Power Development Company of Japan); and foreign coal
producers (for example, the French production monopoly, Charbonnages
de France).
In Table VI we report, by firm, potential 1990 Australian steam coal
exports from projects currently in production or planned for development.
Four firms account for 38 percent, eight firms for 60 percent, and 16
firms for 80 percent of potential 1990 exports. When one considers intercorporate linking and communication through joint venture arrangements or interlocking directorates, the potential for oligopoly in Australian
team coal exports seems greater. For example CSR, the leading firm
with 15 percent of 1990 export potential, is involved in 23 percent (on
16. Coal Survey, Financial Mail, August 14, 1982, at 24.
17. H. SADLER, ENERGY IN AUSTRALIA: POLITICS AND ECONOMICS 104-111 (1981).
18. See AUSTRALIA DEP'T. OF TRADE AND RESOURCES, AUSTRALIAN COAL EXPORT
PROJECTS (1981).
19. Ownership patterns in Australia are in a state of flux. In 1976 the Australian government
outlined requirements for a minimum of 50% Australian-owned equity in most natural resource
projects including coal. The Foreign Investment Review Board has applied these guidelines flexibly
and Australian ownership is increasing, but the issues surrounding foreign ownership remain conroversial. See Australian Economic Survey, 278 ECONOMIST 22 (October 31, 1981).
20. See generally: AUSTRALIA DEP'T. OF INDUSTRY AND COMMERCE, MAJOR MANUFACTURING AND MINING INVESTMENT PROJECTS (1981).
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TABLE VI.
Concentration in the Australian Steam Coal Export MarketProjects for 1990 Production

Firm

No. of projects,

CSR
Shell
BHP
MIM
White
Marathon Pet.
Austr.
British Petroleum
Mitsubishi
Howard Smith
CRA Ltd.
Elec. Comm. of
NSW
Oakbridge Inds.
Arco
Peko Wallsend
Amax
Australian Mutual
Prov. Society
Other
Total

10
7
4
4
1
1

1990 export potential
(10 tly)

a

Cumulative
fraction of 1990
export
pntia
A

B

19.7
11.7
10.1
9.2
8.4
8.0

0.15
0.23
0.31
0.38
0.44
0.50

0.23
0.37
0.46
0.49
0.59
0.65

2
6
3
2
2

7.2
6.6
6.0
4.7
3.6

0.55
0.60
0.64
0.68
0.71

0.73
0.76
0.89
0.89
0.95

1
2
2
1
6

3.0
2.7
2.6
2.3
2.1

0.73
0.75
0.77
0.78
0.80

0.95
0.95
0.95
0.95
0.96

27.0
134.9

1.00

1.00

Not available
40

'Steam coal projects currently in production or planned for development. Excludes projects with
1990 potential less than I Mt/y. In joint ventures, output is apportioned to firms based on ownership.
bThe difference between Column A and B has to do with accounting for output from joint ventures.
In Column A, output is apportioned to firms based on the fraction of ownership or participation in
a joint venture. In Column B, the entire output of a project is associated with the highest ranking
participant.
Sources: DEPARTMENT OF TRADE AND MINERAL RESOURCES, AUSTRALIAN COAL EXPORT PROJECTS (1981); DEPARTMENT OF INDUSTRY AND COMMERCE, MAJOR
MANUFACTURING AND MINING INVESTMENT PROJECTS (June 1981).

October 1983]

INTERNATIONAL STEAM COAL MARKETS

a tonnage basis) of the projects. Projects including at least one of the
four leading firms reported in Table VI-CSR, Shell, BHP and MIMaccount for 49 percent of 1990 export potential. Projects including at
least one of the leading eight firms account for 76 percent of export
potential. Referring to the United States, where relatively strict controls
on interfirm cooperation and communication exist, Scherer states that:
When the leading four firms control 40 percent or more of total
output, it is fair to assume that oligopoly is beginning to rear its
head.2"
The 1990 steam coal export potential listed in Table VI exceeds 130
Mt/yr. Considering that 1980 Australian steam coal exports were under
10 Mt/yr (see Table VII), one might suspect that many of the projects
will not come to fruition. The point is that the structure of Australian
industry--concentration among suppliers and buyers and vertical and
horizontal integration-may influence the price and export market share
of Australian steam coal.
On the importing side,there is a worldwide trend to centralized national
coal purchasing. 2 The classic example is L'Association Technique de
L'Importation de Charbonniere (ATIC), the French coal importing monopsony. Japan and Spain formed state corporations to coordinate coal
imports and investigate overseas development projects. In Italy, South
Korea, and Taiwan, national electric companies dominate import demand
with minimal competition if not cooperation from industrial importers
(especially the cement industry). In Belgium, Denmark, and the Netherlands, utilities and other users have formed voluntary cooperatives to
purchase steam coal. Of the major importers, Germany alone is characterized by fragmentary coal purchasing.
2. Market Shares by Country. There is no consistent source of steam
coal trade data with which to evaluate market shares by country. In Table
VII we present estimates of steam coal exports excluding intra-Communist
bloc trade. In 1979, Poland and the Republic of South Africa (with a
state trading monopoly and domestic cartel, respectively) accounted for
approximately 60 percent of total exports listed. In 1980, Poland, the
Republic of South Africa, Australia, and the United States accounted for
virtually all exports listed.
To evaluate market shares of importing nations, we consider Australian
government forecasts of steam coal imports for 1985 and 1990 (Table
VIII). Those forecasts, based on a country-by-country examination of
-lectric utility capacity expansion and coal conversion plans, provide a
21. F. SCHERER, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 67 (1981).
22. See generally GASKIN, supra note 4.
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TABLE VII.
Estimated Steam Coal Exports
(106 tons/yr)
Country

1979

1980

Australia'
Canada2
RSA'
U.S. 4
(U.S. excluding Canada 4')
Poland 4.
China 4, 1
UK 5,"
USSR
Other

6.2
1.0
16.7
14.1
2.5
20.5
0.3
2.4
NA
NA

9.9
1.3
22.5
26.8
16.0
16.6
0.6
4.0
NA
NA

61.2

81.7

'Exports to West only.
bCalculated from Japanese steam coal imports.
cTotal exports; the annual report of the National Coal Board suggests that exports were mostly for
"steam raising."
Sources: (1) INTERNATIONAL COAL REVIEW 4 (May 12, 1982); (2) personal communication,
Canadian Embassy in Washington; (3) COAL, GOLD AND BASE MINERALS IN SOUTHERN AFRICA 96 (June 1981); (4) COAL INDUSTRY QUARTERLY (Merril Lynch,
December, 1981); (5) personal communication, British Information Services, Washington,
D.C.

consistent, although probably optimistic, short- to mid-term projection.
In east Asia, Japan dominates with about 50 percent of import demand
in 1985 and over 40 percent of demand in 1990. In western Europe, no
country alone is dominant. France accounts for 30 percent of projected
1985 import demand, but only 15 percent of 1990 demand because of
an agressive nuclear program. Germany is the leader in 1990 with under
20 percent of import demand. The ten countries of the European Economic
Community, however, account for almost 90 percent of 1985 import
demand and almost 80 percent of 1990 demand in western Europe.
In this section, we have evaluated concentration of coal producers and
consumers (number of firms and market shares) by country. We also noted
that the role of trading companies or market intermediaries is relevant tc
market concentration. Rather than considering the role of such companies
explicity, we advance to the next element of the structural analysis,
barriers to entry. Evaluation of barriers to entry suggests the importance
of vertical and horizontal integration in coal trade and the market powei
of multi-national corporations.

October 1983]

INTERNATIONAL STEAM COAL MARKETS

TABLE VIII.
Projected Steam Coal Import Demand
1980
(actual, est.)

(106

tons/yr)
1985

1990

-

25-29
9-11
7-8
4-6
1-8

39-52
18-21
15-20
10-13
7-20

15

46-61

88-125

6
I1
9
22
6
4
1
8

7-8
15-17
9-15
25-33
7-11
7-8
11-14
9-21

8-11
17-20
20-39
18-29
14-26
12-15
15-19
23-24

66

89-127

127-193

Middle East (3 countries)

1

0-4

6-10

Latin America (4 countries)

1

1-4

1-9

83

136-196

231-337

East Asia
Japan
South Korea (ROK)
Taiwan
Hong Kong
Other Asia (8 countries)

Western Europe
Belgium/Luxembourg
Denmark
West Germany (FRG)
France
Italy
Netherlands
Spain
Other Europe (8 countries)

Total

8
6
2

Source: AUSTRALIA DEPARTMENT OF TRADE AND RESOURCES, COAL DEMAND STUDY
(June 1981): from country analyses of utility conversion and expansion plans and demand
and conversion in other industries, especially cement.

C. Barriers to Entry
Three important barriers to entry are relevant to the international coal
market: financial resources (export development projects may involve
multi-billion dollar investments), technical capability, and market information. These barriers are particularly effective against the solo entry
into the market of developing countries with attractive resources (Colombia, China, and Indonesia), resource owning firms with little production experience (e.g., White Industries in Australia), and coal producing
firms with little experience in the international market. At the same time,
these barriers provide a market opportunity to multi-national corporations
(MNCs). In fact, much of the literature on MNCs attributes to them two
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important functions: reducing the costs of "arms-length" transactions
(finding buyers and sellers, conducting negotiations, writing complete
contracts), and increasing factor mobility (transferring technical and commercial "know-how" and capital). 23
Vertical and horizontal integration typically characterize the activities
of MNCs. The general trading companies in Japan provide the best example of vertical integration in coal trade. Reportedly, 65 percent of
Japan's large industrial company sector revolves around six industrial
groups (Mitsui, Mitsubishi, Marubeni, C. Itoh, Sumitomo Shoji, and
Nissho Iwai) .24The general trading company establishes corporate policy
and links the resource development, importing, processing, and marketing
activities of subsidiaries and affiliates. Although we have limited information concerning the activities of these general trading companies in
the international coal market, the Economist reports a tendency for the
Japanese companies to bargain jointly with coking coal producers in
Australia.25
Some state coal and electricity production companies also have direct
foreign investments. Spain's Carboex recently purchased a 10 percent
share in Ashland Oil's coal unit. The purchase entitles Carboex to a steady
supply (0.8-1 Mt/yr) at "preferential prices." 26 The Italian government's
AGIP is a joint venture partner in an Australian mine. 7
A firm producing a similar product in different countries represents
horizontal integration. Thus, in the international coal market one sees
mining houses (for example, Rio Tinto Zinc, Anglo-American, and GE's
Utah International) and oil companies (for example, Arco, Shell, BP, and
Exxon) producing and investing in Canada, Australia, the Republic of
South Africa, the United States, and developing countries.
The entry of MNCs into the international coal market tends to increase
efficiency of economic activity; however, questions remain as to how the
market power of MNCs influences competition. While there is a long
history of MNC involvement in mining projects in developing countries,
it is worthwhile to consider a case study of the decisions leading to an
agreement between the Colombian state company, Carbocol, and Intercor,
23. See, e.g., Caves, InternationalCorporations:The IndustrialEconomics of ForeignInvestment,
38 ECONOMICA 1 (1971); Agmon & Hirsch, Multinational Corporationsand the Developins
Economies:PotentialGains in a World of Imperfect Markets and Uncertainty,41 OXFORD BULL
OF ECON. & STAT. 333 (1979); and Teece, The Multinational Enterprise: Market Failure anu
Market Power Considerations,22 SLOAN MGMT. REV. 3 (1981).
24. Helou, Sogo Soshas and Japan'sForeign Economic Relations, 13 J. WLD. TRADE LAh
257, 261 (1979).
25. ECONOMIST, supra note 19, at 15.
26. Spain Authorizes Firm to Purchase 10% Stake in Unit of Ashland Oil, Wall St. J., March 9
1982, at 27.
27. AUSTRALIA DEP'T. OF INDUSTRY AND COMMERCE, supra note 20.
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a subsidiary of Exxon, to develop the northern area of El Cerrejon as an
export project."
In the mid 1970s, Colombia's state oil company, ECOPETROL, and
a state industrial development institute, IFI, were competing for the rights
to develop El Cerrejon. In early 1976, the Ministry of Mines requested
development bids for El Cerrejon. In November 1976, Carbocol was
created with 49 percent ownership by ECOPETROL, 40 percent by IFI,
and 11 percent by other parts of the Ministry of Mines. In December
1976, Carbocol signed a joint-venture agreement with Intercor providing
equal sharing of investment costs and production, a 15 percent royalty
of Intercor production to the government, and for Intercor to operate the
project.
In his study of the project, Kline makes several important observations:
first, ECOPETROL and Exxon had a history of cooperation in the oil
industry; second, there was little public debate about the type of contract
to be used at El Cerrejon; third, the final contract is silent about the
amount of production; and fourth, there are concerns about the transfer
pricing practices of Intercor as the operator of the mine, the railroad, and
the port.29 Kline does not claim that Carbocol could have done better,
but rather notes the highly political atmosphere in which decisions were
made in Colombia and the lack of publicly available economic and financial analysis--conditions which favor the MNC.
D. Structure of Demand
In this section we discuss considerations in the consumer choice of
coal as a feedstock and the selection of sources of coal supply. The
principal substitutes for steam coal are oil, gas, and nuclear power. The
interplay between the price of oil and coal can be appreciated from Figure
2, where the cost of generated electricity is given as a function of the
price of fuel. Three curves are shown. Curve A roughly corresponds to
a new baseload coal-fired power station. Curve B roughly corresponds
to a new baseload oil (or natural gas) generating station, and Curve C to
an existing oil-fired station. As can be seen from Table IV, delivered coal
prices in Europe and Japan are about $2.70/106 Btu. Thus, coal provides
-heaper electric power than a new oil plant that burns fuel at $4.25/106
Btu or an existing oil plant that bums fuel at $4.70/106 Btu. Residual
fuel oil prices (to U.S. electric utilities) have been about $5.00/106 Btu
Juring the year ending in mid-1982. 30 Coal is therefore a lower cost
28. See generally: Kline, The Coal of "El Cerrejon:"An HistoricalAnalysis of Major Colombian
Policy Decisions and MNC Activities, 35 INTER-AMERICAN ECON. AFFAIRS 69 (198 1).
29. Id. at 85-89.
30. U.S. DEP'T. OF ENERGY, MONTHLY ENERGY REVIEW 90 (Jan. 1983).
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The cost of generating electricity from oil and coal.

choice for Europe and Japan unless oil prices soften further. However,
the relative youth of oil and gas boilers, high interest rates, and tight
capital markets retard the substitution of coal for oil and gas.
The economics of coal versus nuclear power are very close, depending
on expectations regarding construction schedules, fuel and capital costs,
and interest rates. Thus political as much as economic factors explain the
contribution of nuclear power in different countries.
Considering the relatively high ratio of fuel input to energy producl
costs in the electricity sector3 1-the predominant user of steam coal31. An estimate of delivered coal prices (imported or subsidized domestic) in Europe is 15-2:
mills/kWh (1977$). Capital and operating costs of electricity generation are in the range 20-25 mills
kWh. See A. BAKER & M. PRIOR, THE ECONOMICS OF ELECTRICITY FROM COAL
NUCLEAR AND WIND ENERGY 21,31 (lEA Coal Research, 1980).
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one might expect coal buyers to select supplies exclusively on the basis
of price. But, reliability of supply may also influence utility purchasing
practices. This is due to the volatility of coal markets32 and the charter
of regulated or national utilities to supply reliable power. The extent to
which consumers address these concerns through the diversification of
sources of supply is unclear.
E. Government Policy
At least four kinds of government policies affect trade patterns: the
formation of economic blocs, preferential trading patterns or embargoes
between countries, export and import quotas and tariffs, and subsidies to
domestic production.
Blocs or common markets are relevant to Europe with the European
Economic Community (EEC) and the eastern European Council of Mutual
Economic Assistance (CMEA). The CMEA does not appear to have a
formal energy trade policy. Maddock, however, describes the increased
energy dependence of eastern European nations on the Soviet Union.33
The Soviet Union faces a difficult choice between hard currency earnings
from oil and gas exports to the West and trade with CMEA partners.
Maddock believes the Soviets will choose the latter course in return for
increased economic integration within CMEA. If this view prevails, one
sees Polish and Soviet coal export potential as an erratic residual of CMEA
supply and demand.
The coal-related policies of the EEC are advisory. Nonetheless, aggregate steam coal import demand of EEC nations is significant in total
world import demand. The EEC nations enjoy similar importance in wheat
trade and have established a variable import levy on wheat imports. Carter
and Schmitz argue that this tariff generates monopsony power and plays
a critical role in wheat price formation for the EEC-an example that
could be applied to steam coal imports.3"
Politically motivated embargoes have had little effect on coal trade. A
few relatively small importers, including Ireland, Sweden, and Finland,
prohibit imports of South African coal.35 Preferential trade patterns may
32. Witness the virtual cessation of Polish exports in 1981, the recurrent labor strife in Australia,
the port backlog and demurrage costs in U.S. ports in 1981, and the potentially explosive racial
relations of the Republic of South Africa.
33. Maddock, Energy and Integration: The Logic of Interdependence in the Soviet Union and
Eastern Europe, 12 J. COMMON MKT. STUDIES 21 (1980).
34. Carter & Schmitz, Import Tariffs and Price Formation in the World Wheat Market, 61 AM.
J. AG. ECON 517 (1979).
35. AUSTRALIA DEP'T OF TRADE AND RESOURCES, COAL DEMAND STUDY, DRAFT:
AN ANALYSIS OF CURRENT AND PROJECTED COAL IMPORT REQUIREMENTS OF MAJOR
PROSPECTIVE CONSUMING COUNTRIES FOR AUSTRALIAN COALS 3.6.2, 4.2.3, 4.5.3
(1981).
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have a modest effect on coal markets. The Japanese might, for example,
favor U.S. coal to counter their massive trade surplus with the United
States. However, it is unclear how such a national preference would be
transferred to coal buyers.
Tariffs on coal trade are rare or nonexistent, but quotas are found among
exporters and importers. South Africa's export quota merits special attention.36 South Africa has virtually no indigenous resources of petroleum
and natural gas and depends on coal for about 80 percent of primary
energy consumption. The South African Department of Mineral and Energy Affairs recently projected an increase in domestic coal consumption
from about 90 Mt/yr in 1980 to 740Mt/yr in 2020. In 1974, the government instituted an export quota allocated to individual companies, ostensibly to preserve resources for long-term domestic use. In July 1981, the
government again increased the quota from 44 Mt/yr under phase III of
the export program to 80 Mt/yr.37 The phase IV export levels are likely
to be reached by the early 1990s.
A variety of issues bear on the setting and distribution of the South
African quota. First, quota levels are justified by reference to coal reserve
levels. The official reserve estimate doubled from 1976 to 1981. 38 Thus,
the 80 million tons per year export level over 30 years represents less
than five percent of official reserves. Second, criticism of the inefficiency
of domestic price controls may increase, though higher electricity prices
would have an adverse effect on the economics of extraction and processing of other traded commodities, notably gold and diamonds. Third,
squabbling persists over the allocation of export licenses. A portion of
quotas has been awarded to MNCs to encourage the flow of oil to South
Africa. In addition, independent coal companies seek to enter the lucrative
export market at the expense of the major mining houses. In any case,
it seems reasonable to assume that the South African export quota is a
potential vehicle to increase market power, rather than a mere constraint
on industry.39
Many of the principal coal importing nations have protected domestic
industries in the past. Germany has a quota system that links imports of
coal to consumption of domestic coal. France, West Germany, Belgium,
Japan, and the United Kingdom subsidize domestic coal production by
36. See generally: South Africa's Coal Sector, Memo from American Consulate General, Johannesburg, Republic of South Africa to U.S. Department of State, (Feb. 5, 1982).
37. South Africa Export Quota Lifted, 297 MINING J. 185 (1981).
38. Recoverable Coal Reserves Increased, 297 MINING J. 42 (1981).
39. In July 1982, the Republic of South Africa allocated the phase IV quotas. Over half the
tonnage went to the TCOA or its major conglomerate members. A number of additional allocations
went to small producers, but reportedly with instructions to market cooperatively. See New South
African Export Quotas Bring in Wide Industry Participation,INT'L. COAL REPORT 2,3 (July 16,
1982).
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such practices as a state production monopoly, preferential purchasing
by state utilities, or direct subsidies.4" Generally, domestic production
levels are likely to remain flat due to limited opportunities for new mine
openings and political pressures against closing inefficient mines.
Aside from the four classes of government policy discussed above,
there are a variety of other influences governments or nations may have
on trade. In Australia, the federal government must approve export contracts (prices and quantities), and the state coal boards must approve new
mine openings. Federal government power has been used in slack markets
to compel producers to bargain jointly, and to counteract the market power
of buyers. 4
In Japan, private industry and government often act in concert. Ozawa,
for example, describes the Japanese system of "resource diplomacy"
involving foreign aid grants and low interest loans from the Export-Import
Bank of Japan to support resource development ventures initiated by the
private sector."
In summary, the effect of government policy, in some cases, is to
further diminish the competitive appearance of numbers of buyers (notably
in Japan and potentially in the EEC) and sellers (Australia and, especially,
South Africa).
F. Summary of Market Structure
In the wide-ranging discussion above, we reviewed basic conditions
of the market and conventional elements of market structure as a means
to identify participants with potential to exercise market power. Table IX
provides a summary of this analysis. The upper part of the table is a
laundry list of types of coal producers and consumers by country. Some
of the elements of the market structure analysis-spatial distribution of
resources, barriers to entry, market shares, and government policyprovide a filter to identify the key actors in the market.
On the demand side, we reported a trend toward national coal buying.
Yet, with the exception of Japan, most nations have a relatively small
share of even regional markets. The nations of the EEC might, however,
adopt a unified policy or strategy for coal development and purchasing.
On the supply side, South Africa clearly has the appearance of an oligopolist enjoying very low production costs, a tight domestic producer
cartel, and government export licenses and quotas. Poland, with low
transport costs to western Europe and a state trading monopoly, also
40. See generally GASKIN, supra note 4.
41. Banbrick, Australian Mineral Commodity Marketing, 6 RESOURCES POLICY 166 (1980).
42. Ozawa, Japan's New Resource Diplomacy: Government Backed Group Investment, 14 J.
WLD. TRADE LAW 3 (1980).
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TABLE IX.
Structure of International Steam Coal Market
Types of Participants
Producers
Producer cartel (South Africa)
Private firms (Canada, Australia, U.S.)
MNCs (throughout the world)
State monopolies (developing countries)
State monopolies (France and other importing
nations)
State trading (Poland)

Consumers
Regional utilities (Germany, Japan, U.S.)
Utility coal-buying co-ops (Holland, Belgium
and others)
State importing or development companies
(Japan, Spain, France and others)
National utilities (France, Korea, Taiwan,
Japan and others)
General trading companies (Japan)

* horizontal and vertical integration
government policy (quotas, tariffs, and
common markets)
* market shares (by firm or country)
* spatial distribution of resources

Market structure analysiA

Key Actors
Producers
South Africa
Poland
Australia
MNC

Consumers
Japan
EEC (potential)

represents a supplier with potential market power. Even with the possibility of foreign investment, the Australian steam coal export industry is
relatively concentrated. Mechanisms such as the federal export permit
system, state ownership of railroads, and labor union power bolster the
opportunities for Australia to exercise market power.
We have found no data to indicate the market share of individual MNCs.
It is conceivable, however, that combined production of a MNC and its
subsidiaries in the United States, Canada, Australia, South Africa, and
developing countries, could represent a significant share of total trade.
Finally, there is a remote possibility of a formal producer cartel.
Given the diverse elements of market structure, it is not surprising that
this analysis reveals no neat, simple market structure such as a producer
or consumer cartel. We are also far from ideal market conditions such as
easy entry and exit, factor mobility, many small buyers and sellers, and
the
no institutional distortions. Caves calls the "essence of oligopoly ...
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recognition of market interdependence. "43 In other words, the market
strategies (in terms of prices and quantities) of buyers and sellers are
interdependent. This seems to be a general, but accurate, characterization
of the international steam coal market. How strategies are formulated is
the subject of the next section.
III. MARKET CONDUCT
In the last section we were concerned with organizational characteristics
of the international steam coal market-that is, market structure. In this
section, we explore the pricing and production strategies of agents involved in the market-that is, market conduct. Following McCalla," 4 we
consider the objectives and strategies of the most important participants
in coal trade (as defined in Table IX).
A. Objectives
The objective of the TCOA (the producer cartel in South Africa) is to
maximize long-run cartel profits. In tandem, the South African government wants to maximize long-run producer earnings, but is also concerned
with the conservation of coal for domestic consumption for the very long
run.
Left to its own, Poland's state coal trading company would also attempt
to maximize long-run profits or hard currency export earnings. But the
direction of the Polish economy seems closely bound to CMEA (the
Council of Mutual Economic Assistance) and the Soviet Union, obscuring
the statement of Polish objectives.
The developing country monopolies presumably have multiple objectives: maximization of long-run rents from coal, information transfer and
regional economic development, and substitution of coal for petroleum
in domestic consumption to reduce oil imports or free oil for export.
Domestic politics may also affect the operation of the state monopolies.
The MNCs are not only horizontally integrated in coal production, but
typically produce substitute energy commodities or other minerals. Energy
producing companies may also be vertically integrated with oil refineries,
coal conversion complexes, and marketing and distribution networks.
Thus, while MNCs attempt to maximize long-run profits, conflicting
43. Caves, supra note 23, at 1.
44. McCalla, Strategies in InternationalAgricultural Marketing: Public vs. Private Sector, in
INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND AGRICULTURE: THEORY AND POLICY 209 (1979). McCalla
conducts a modified analysis of market structure, conduct, and performance in wheat and coarse
grain trade. After identifying the key actors in the market, McCalla characterizes their objectives
and discusses their potential strategies in a multi-lateral framework. His intent is to identify the
dominant forces in market operation, especially price formation, and to develop hypotheses for
empirical or theoretical testing.
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objectives may exist among subsidiaries producing different products in
different nations.
The Japanese, typical of some other consuming nations, face the conflicting objectives of promoting coal substitution to reduce oil imports,
minimizing fuel (and capital) costs, and ensuring reliability of supply. It
is worth noting that the Japanese strategy for economic development
involves a shift from resource intensive basic industries, with heavy
dependence on imports of primary commodities, to high value-added
manufacturing (knowledge-intensive) sectors. In that regard, Ozawa suggests that
Japan's primary goal in making overseas extractive investments is
to stabilize its sources of supply. Profitability of a specific extractive
investment is rather a secondary consideration.45
However, whenever a national goal appears to conflict with private, profit
maximizing goals, it is important to ask how the national goal is conveyed
to the private sector. Without such a mechanism, buyers may continue
to act on the basis of private economic criteria.
B. Strategies
At present, the strategies of the Republic of South Africa and Poland
seem most important to development of the steam coal market. An industry analyst has suggested that the primary South African strategy is
to set FOB port prices that will undersell the U.S. delivered price to
Europe by a "few" dollars. 6 The analyst reported that until mid-1981,
the Poles did the same. (This strategy is consistent with the prices reported
in Table III). Thus, South African and Polish output is determined by
U.S. supply costs.
It is conceivable that the South Africans in particular could assume a
more active price leadership role, affording greater discretion about output
levels and, more importantly, deterring entry into the market of developing
countries and new producers in Australia, Canada, and the United States.
Some evidence of such a role can be found in the 1982 agreement between
the TCOA and Japanese steelmakers that escalated soft coking coal prices
only $2/t (3.6%) above the 1981 level. 47 Coal Outlook reports that western
U.S. suppliers to Japan cannot compete with that price. 48
45. Ozawa, Japan'sResource Dependency and OverseasInvestment, 11J. WLD. TRADE LAW
52 (1977).
46. Telephone conversation between David Abbey and Shirley Strzelecki, Editor, Coal Week
Int'l, February 17, 1982.
47. Of course the weakened position of the Sourth African currency (rand) is one explanation for
this modest price rise.
48. South African Price Affects West, 6 COAL OUTLOOK 12 (1982).
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The pricing strategies of Australian producers may hinge on the opportunities for informal cooperation among firms and the exercise of
export controls by the federal government, as well as the escalation of
rail tariffs and the wage gains of labor unions. At present, Australian
steam coal exporters are seeking shares of the European market-for
example, by investing in ports and coal-fired ships to reduce transportation
costs. Competition in Europe may require lower FOB port prices than
necessary to compete in Japan (assuming price discrimination is not possible). Some producers advocate abandonment of the European market
and concentration on the east Asia market with potentially higher profit
margins. Pursuit of such a strategy depends on the possibility of limiting
competition and total exports.
For the developing countries, pursuit of joint venture agreements with
MNCs or consumers seems necessary. Such agreements may require
initially favorable terms for foreign investment, because there is certainly
no scarcity of investment opportunities. Nevertheless, foreign investment
provides the host country with more thorough exploration of resources,
the transportation infrastructure necessary for futher development (deepdraft ports and rail lines), and greater familiarity with international market
opportunities. Because Colombia's joint venture with Intercor commits
only 15 Mt/yr, Colombia may pursue subsequent development independently. Developing countries such as China and Indonesia also may grant
attractive terms for export projects but require fractions of mine output
to supply the domestic market.
The heterogeneity of activities and interests of vertically or horizontally
integrated MNCs makes any discussion of strategy difficult. Nonetheless,
we offer several important observations. First, corporate risks are minimized by investing in production capabilities in the world's most stable
economies and by having spatially diverse production capability. Thus,
Helleiner cites a United Nations' study that indicates that between 1970
and 1973 over 80 percent of market-economy investment in minerals
exploration occurred in Australia, Canada, the Republic of South Africa,
and the United States.4 9 Perhaps not surprisingly these are the dominant
exporting countries in the international coal market. More recently, coal
exploration and development activities of the MNCs have expanded to
developing countries.
Second, and somewhat contradictory to the first point, is the fact that
MNCs with spatially diverse and multiproduct production capacity benefit
most from market instability." ° Such organizations can react quickly to
49. Helleiner, StructuralAspects of Third World Trade:Some Trends and Prospects, 15 J. DEVEL.
STUDIES 70 (1979).
50. McCalla, supra note 44, at 227.

NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL

[Vol. 23

changes in market conditions, to price changes, and technological developments. Third, a proliferation of joint ventures amont MNCs increases market power and opportunities for collusion.
The strategies pursued by the Japanese government and trading companies may be representative of consumers in general. Most important,
keen competition among suppliers is desirable. The Japanese do this in
part by advertising an intent to diversify supplies. Their actions in 1980
and 1981 seem to have provoked a near frenzy among producers and
reserve holders in the western United States that diminished within a year.
The more effective strategy to promote competition of course is to reach
joint venture agreements with developing countries or potential producers
in the United States, Canada, and Australia.
A subtle aspect of Japanese resource acquisition is what Ozawa calls
the system-focused strategy,5 which relates to the role of general trading
companies discussed earlier in the paper. In joint venture agreements, a
Japanese subsidiary may be relatively generous in granting concessions.
Yet the industrial group benefits in other ways, such as supply contracts
for capital goods. In addition, the Japanese retain control of the flow of
resources. With automated loading facilities, deep-water ports, and computer control of shipment rates and stockpiles, the Japanese achieve economies in logistics that preserve the competitiveness of industry.
IV. MODELS OF IMPERFECT COMPETITION
The purpose of this section is to connect the highly institutional analysis
of the previous sections with economic theories of imperfect competition.
Our goal is to identify plausible behavioral theories for coal trade. As
indicated previously, it is probable that the United States in particular
will remain as a competitive fringe, no matter what structures and conduct
evolve in the remainder of the world. Australia, Poland and the Republic
of South Africa have the potential to act non-cooperatively as oligopolists
or jointly as a cartel. Japan can act as a regional monopsonist in the
Pacific basin, because it is the dominant coal consumer in that region.
Finally, European countries can form a buyer cartel, setting tariffs or
quotas for the EEC as a whole. The potential for MNC market manipulation exists but is difficult to quantify, given our current state of information.
Thus, a host of potential market structures exist with an even larger
array of potential strategies for pricing and output decisions. We are not
suggesting that any of these structures actually characterize the market;
we only wish to explore potential structures. (The logical next step is to
51. Ozawa, supra note 45, at 68.
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econometrically test hypotheses about market conduct.) We now turn to
a brief review of theories of cartel and oligopoly/oligopsony operation.
A. Cartels
Conceptually, the most simple form of market manipulation involves
collusion or cooperation on the part of several market participants. A
cartel can form on either the producer or consumer side, although we are
most accustomed to producer cartels. The behavior of natural resources
cartels has received renewed attention over the past decade, due principally to the rise of OPEC. 2
As stated by Osborne, 53 there are four internal decisions for cartel
operation: location of the frontier of possible price and output levels for
cartel participants (the contract surface); choice of price and output levels
for cartel members (the sharing problem); and detection and deterrence
of cheating by cartel members. Osborne suggests that locating the contract
curve and detecting cheating are the principal problems facing a perfect
cartel (i.e. where payments from one cartel member to another-sidepayments-are possible). For a perfect cartel, joint revenue maximization
is the cartel objective. However, if side-payments are excluded (as would
likely be the case with an international coal cartel), the problem of determining the appropriate share of profits for each cartel member becomes
more significant.
If side payments are excluded and the product of the gains to each
member from forming a cartel is maximized, one arrives at Nash's well
known solution to the bargaining problem. But the Nash equilibrium is
not the sole solution to the bargaining problem. For instance, a simple
(and thus enforceable) pricing rule (such as uniform price for all members)
could result in another solution.
In summary, while there is no single solution to the cartel pricing
problem, the set of possible outcomes (that is, the bargaining set) can be
restricted. If there are not large gains from cartel formation, then the
bargaining set may be quite small. We have also suggested two possible
strategies for operating a cartel: joint profit maximization and maximization of gains from cartel formation.
In any case, a cartel is an unlikely model for the steam coal market.
We mentioned previously the difficulty of side-payments in international
markets involving nations as key actors. Scherere4 suggests some other
practical problems. First, with non-homogeneity and spatial differentia52. Most recent work has involved case studies of cartels for oil or non-energy commodities. for
a review, see C. KOLSTAD, D. ABBEY & R. BIVINS, MODELING INTERNATIONAL COAL
TRADE 34 (Los Alamos National Laboratory, 1983).
53. Osborne, Cartel Problems, 66 AM. ECON. REV. 835 (1976).
54. F. SCHERER, supra note 21, at 199.
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tion of products, coordination of policy is difficult, because it must address
not only price but product specifications (for example, coal ash and sulfur
content) and transportation costs. Second, secrecy and retaliation lags,
as occur under long-term contracting, deter coordination among cartel
members. Third, the lumpiness or infrequency of orders encourages members to undercut prices. Finally, industries characterized by high fixed
costs such as coal mining are susceptible to breakdowns of price discipline
in periods of slack demand.
B. Non-Cooperative Equilibria
We now turn to the case where there is no collusion among the participants in the coal market. In this category fall the extremes of perfect
competition and monopoly or monopsony. In between lie oligopoly, oligopsony and bilateral oligopoly.
Since monopoly or monopsony are special cases of oligopoly and
oligopsony, we consider oligopoly, oligopsony and bilateral oligopoly.
Each of these cases involves a set of participants with the potential to
exercise market power. Our analysis of how these participants interact is
largely independent of whether they are consumers or producers, and
thus for convenience, we concentrate on oligopoly models.
The oldest and best known model of oligopoly behavior derives from
Cournot, who hypothesized that oligopolists determine output based on
the output levels of their opponents.55 The Nash equilibrium which results
is often called a Cournot-Nash equilibrium. 6 Betrand hypothesized a
similar model with prices as the observed variable instead of quantities.
In the 1930s von Stackelberg took a step forward suggesting that some
oligopolists ("leaders") might react not only to their opponents' output
levels but to how these output levels are affected by the leaders' actions.
Bresnahan has recently synthesized these approaches into the concept of
a full information of "consistent conjectures" equilibrium where each
oligopolist reacts to his opponents' reaction functions. 7
This variety of behavioral models is the principal obstacle to determinant analysis of oligopoly behavior. McCalla's classic model of duopoly in world wheat markets makes a variety of assumptions about duopoly
operations which yield a unique set of prices and production levels. 8
55. For a review of models of oligopoly equilibria, see J. FRIEDMAN, OLIGOPOLY AND THE
THEORY OF GAMES (1977).
56. The Nash equilibrium referred to here should not be confused with Nash's solution to the
cartel bargaining problem.
57. Bresnahan, Duopoly Models with Consistent Conjectures, 71 AM. ECON. REV. 934 (1981).
58. McCalla, A Duopoly Model of World Wheat Pricing, 48 J. FARM ECON. 711 (1966). See
also, Alaouze, Sturgess & Watson Oligopoly Pricing in the World Wheat Market, 60 AM. J. AG.
ECON. 173 (1978).
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FIGURE 3. Hypothetical demand and marginal revenue curves faced by regional monopolists.
Most of the handful of other applied analyses assume only a Cournot
type model."
C. Policies to Deter Entry
A final issue requiring treatment is how oligopolists (if they exist) may
deter entry of competitors. We suggested previously that oligopolists will
likely be countries, or in the case of the EEC, a group of countries. Much
of the potential producer market power derives from a fortunate initial
endowment of resources. Nevertheless, producing countries in particular
face potential new competitors from developing countries.
One of the simplest ways to explain producer market manipulation is
to view each regional monopolist as facing a kinked demand curve (Figure
3). If production costs are in the vicinity of the kink, optimal (limit)
pricing will be at or just below that of the competitive fringe (as indicated
in Figure 3). This result is consistent with the discussion in prior sections
which suggested that the Republic of South Africa prices a "few" dollars
below the United States (in delivered price terms). But limit pricing may
not be consistent with classic oligopoly models such as Cournot's. Implicit
59. See, e.g., Levhari & Mirman, The Great Fish War: An Example Using a Dynamic CournotNash Solution, 11 BELL J. ECON. 322 (1980); and Salant, Imperfect Competition in the International
Energy Market, 30 OPERATIONS RESEARCH 252 (1982).
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in limit pricing is consideration of how one's opponents react to pricing
actions in the vicinity of the kink.
Gaskins provides the first fully dynamic analysis of limit pricing strategies. 6 Gilbert and Goldman treat the case of dynamic limit pricing for
an exhaustible resource cartel. 6 Salant explores in detail limit pricing
strategies for the OPEC cartel, which faces a "backstop" alternative to
oil. 6 2 Spence proposes an alternate theory to explain deterrence to entry
of competitors.6 3 He suggests that excess capacity on the part of oligopolistic firms can be an effective deterrent because the potential entrant
faces competition which has the capacity to reduce potential profits to
zero. On the other hand, Scherer observes the common occurrence of
new entry and capacity expansion leading to the breakdown of oligopolist's market shares.'
V. CONCLUSIONS
In Parts II and III we identified those actors in the international steam
coal market with the potential to exercise market power-at a minimum,
the Republic of South Africa, Poland, Japan, Australia, and the European
Economic Community. Unfortunately, the discussion of strategies and
market conduct in general was speculative or inconclusive.
The review of theories of imperfect competition in the last section
suggested the applicability of non-cooperative models of oligopoly and
oligopsony to the steam coal market. However, that review was likewise
inconclusive, because of the variety of imperfect market models and the
difficulty in reducing this variety based on specific characteristics of the
steam coal market.
The challenge for the future is to compare implications of behavioral
models for pricing and production decisions with data on market prices
and trade flows: in other words, to test hypotheses about market conduct. 65
Such research is complicated by a dearth of data due to the youth of the
steam coal market. However, data are slowly becoming available on
historic prices and flows for steam coal, and some engineering estimates
have been made of production relations for steam coal. Although testing
60. Gaskins, Dynamic Limit Pricing: Optimal Pricing Under Threat of Entry, 3 J. ECON. THEORY 306 (1971).
61. Gilbert & Goldman, Potential Competition and the Monopoly Price of an Exhaustible Resource, 17 J. ECON. THEORY 319 (1978).
62. Salant, Staving off the Backstop: Dynamic Limit-Pricing with a Kinked Demand Curve, in I1
ADVANCES IN THE ECONOMICS OF ENERGY AND RESOURCES 187 (1979).
63. Spence, Entry, Capacity, Investment and Oligopolistic Pricing, 8 BELL J. ECON. 534 (1977).
64. F. SCHERER, supra note 21, at 252.
65. For some exploratory work on this line see C. KOLSTAD, D. ABBEY & R. BIVINS, supra
note 52, and C. KOLSTAD and D. ABBEY, THE EFFECT OF MARKET CONDUCT ON INTERNATIONAL COAL TRADE (Los Alamos National Laboratory, 1983).
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hypotheses about market conduct taxes current econometric capabilities,
methods are becoming available.'
Our basic conclusion, derived from structural analysis, is that the international steam coal market does not appear to be perfectly competitive.
This finding has wide-ranging policy implications, from the U.S. Government's interest in increasing coal exports to the western European and
Japanese efforts to reduce dependence on imported oil and gas. We hope
that further research can define a specific model of market operation to
be used for quantitative policy analysis.

66. For a brief review see Bresnahan, Identificaton of Market Power (1981) (unpublished paper,
Econ. Dept., Stanford Univ.).

